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SOUTH DAKOTA V. BOURLAND: THE COURT
REPLACES THE CAVALRY
I. INTRODUCTION
In South Dakota v. Bourland' the Supreme Court determined
that the Cheyenne River Sioux could not regulate hunting and fishing
on lands owned by the federal government within the tribe's reserva-
tion. Initially, the majority decision by Justice Thomas seems remark-
able only for its blandness; it is ironic that such dry prose threatens a
150-year-old principle of federal Indian2 law-that Native American
tribes possess inherent sovereign powers over reservation lands.3
This sovereign power status resulted in rules of law that require
courts to defer to tribal rights when interpreting federal treaties and
statutes.4 Although Congress has broad power to abrogate tribal
1. 113 S. Ct. 2309, 2321 (1993).
2. The term "Indian" is used in this Note in keeping with the consistent use of the
term in this area of the law. The Author does so, however, while fully aware of the inaccu-
racies and inadequacies of the term.
3. Chief Justice Marshall laid the foundation of federal Indian law in the Cherokee
cases: Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823), Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), and particularly in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S (6 Pet.) 515
(1832). In Worcester he noted that "the settled doctrine of the law of nations is, that a
weaker power does not surrender its independence-its right to self government, by asso-
ciating with a stronger, and taking its protection." Worcester, 31 U.S. at 560-61.
Over the years, the Court has recognized some limitations on Chief Justice Marshall's
broad formulation of tribal sovereignty, primarily when essential tribal rights were not
involved and the rights of Indians would not be jeopardized. See, e.g., New Mexico v.
Mescalero Apache Tlibe, 462 U.S. 324, 331-32 (1983); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219
(1959). However, Worcester's core principle has retained its force, and it has been said that
"factors of personality, history, pragmatism, and philosophy have locked together to make
Worcester an enduring artifice, almost a physical presence. The case is continually cited in
the modem Indian law decisions. Indeed, regardless of subject matter, Worcester is one of
the Supreme Court's most lasting statements... ." CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AmERICAN
INDIANS, TIME, AND Tm LAw: NATIVE SocmETiEs IN A MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL DE-
MOCRACY 30 (1987) (citation omitted).
4. See McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973) ("The
Indian sovereignty doctrine is relevant.., because it provides a backdrop against which
the applicable treaties and federal statutes must be read."); see also FELIX S. COHEN,
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 37-38 (1942) (explaining traditional rules of treaty
interpretation).
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treaty rights.' it must clearly express its intent to do so.6 In the Bour-
land decision the Supreme Court wrongly turned its back on this his-
tory and precedent. The Court, rather than requiring express
congressional intent to abrogate treaty rights, inferred an intent that
Congress almost certainly did not have. The Court has, moreover,
made a more fundamental change in federal Indian law: In a foot-
note, the Court offhandedly discarded the principle of tribal inherent
sovereignty over nonmembers on reservation lands.7 This latter part
of the decision is the main focus of this Note.8
In Part II this Note reviews the historical legal framework within
which Boudand was decided and the traditional rules of law under-
pinning tribal sovereignty and treaty interpretation. Part III details
the conflict which led to the suit and the lower courts' decisions. Part
IV reviews the Supreme Court's decision, and Part V criticizes both
the decision's abandonment of inherent sovereignty and its revision of
treaty interpretation principles.
5. "[I]t is now generally recognized that the power derives from federal responsibility
for regulating commerce with Indian tribes and for treaty making." McClanahan, 411 U.S.
at 172 n.7.
Furthermore,
"presumably such power will be exercised onlywhen circumstances arise which
will not only justify the government in disregarding the stipulations of the treaty,
but may demand, in the interest of the country and the Indians themselves, that it
should do so. When, therefore, treaties were entered into between the United
States and a tribe of Indians it was never doubted that the power to abrogate
existed in Congress ......
Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 594 (1977) (quoting Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,
187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903)).
6. "'[P]roper respect both for tribal sovereignty itself and for the plenary authority of
Congress in this area cautions that we tread lightly in the absence of clear indications of
legislative intent.'" Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987) (quoting Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 60 (1978)); see also County of Yakima v. Confeder-
ated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 112 S. Ct. 683, 686-91 (1992) (discussing
example of unmistakable and clear intefnt of Congress to permit state taxation of Indian
lands); United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734,738 (1986) ("We have required that Congress'
intention to abrogate Indian treaty rights be clear and plain."); Menominee Tribe of Indi-
ans v. United States, 391 U.S. 404,413 (1968) (deciding that act expressly terminating tribal
jurisdiction in favor of state jurisdiction over "Indian Country" within state borders did not
implicitly terminate any other right or privilege granted by treaty).
7. South Dakota v. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. 2309, 2320 n.15 (1993).
8. wo recent articles examined the Bourland case but focused on different aspects of
the decision. One examined the Court's application of recent precedent relating to treaty
abrogation, Chad W. Swensen, Note, South Dakota v. Bourland. Drowning Cheyenne
River Sioux Tribal Sovereignty in a Flood of Broken Promises, 39 S.D. L. Rnv. 181 (1994).
The other generally approved of the decision as an attempt to strike the appropriate bal-
ance between Indians and non-Indians living on reservation lands. Veronica L. Bowen,
The Extent of Indian Regulatory Authority over Non-Indians: South Dakota v. Bourland,
27 CRncm-roN L. Rnv. 605 (1994).
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II. HISTORICAL FRAMiEwoRK
A. Indian Tribes as Sovereign Powers
1. The concept of sovereignty
Sovereignty denotes autonomy and the powers of self-govern-
ance. Accordingly, the judicial classification of tribes as inherently
sovereign has had a real-world impact on who governs reservation
lands. To understand the departure from tradition encompassed by
Justice Thomas's majority decision in South Dakota v. Bourland,9 it is
essential to first understand what tribal sovereignty has meant in the
historical legal framework of federal Indian law.
The courts have repeatedly recognized that Indian tribes possess
the "'inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which [have] never
been extinguished,' "1o even after conquest. In his watershed treatise,
Felix Cohen summarized the resulting foundational precepts of fed-
eral Indian law:
The whole course of judicial decision on the nature of
Indian tribal powers is marked by adherence to.three funda-
mental principles: (1) An Indian tribe possesses, in the first
instance, all the powers of any sovereign state. (2) Conquest
renders, the tribe subject to the legislative power of the
United States and, in substance, terminates the external
powers of sovereignty of the tribe, e.g., its power to enter
into treaties with foreign nations, but does not by itself affect
the internal sovereignty of the tribe, i.e., its powers of local
self-government. (3) These powers are subject to qualifica-
tion by treaties and by express legislation of Congress, but,
save as thus expressly qualified, full powers of internal sover-
eignty are vested in the Indian tribes and in their duly consti-
tuted organs of government.11
Chief Justice Marshall provided the initial framework for under-
standing tribal sovereignty. He reasoned in Cherokee Nation v. Geor-
9. 113 S. Ct. 2309 (1993).
10. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978) (emphasis omitted) (quoting
FEux S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDiAN LAW 122 (1945)). Unless limited by
treaty or act of Congress, "a tribe has the power to determine tribe membership, to regu-
late domestic relations among tribe members, and to prescribe rules'for the inheritance of
property." Id. at 322 n.18 (citations omitted). Sovereignty also includes "the power of the
tribe to determine and define its own form of government," COHEN, supra note 4, at 126,
and to "regulate the use and disposition of individual property among its members," id. at
143.
11. COHEN, supra note 4, at 123.
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gia12 and Worcester v. Georgia1 3 that a tribe's sovereignty stemmed
from its independent control of a geographic area. 4 Nevertheless, the
tribe's autonomy often creates regulatory and jurisdictional tension
between the tribe and the state in which it is located because each
wishes to control both behavior and property on the reservation.15
The Cherokee cases themselves are early examples of the power
struggle between states and tribes; Georgia wanted jurisdiction over
reservation lands, but the Court determined that inherent tribal sover-
eignty meant that
[t]he Cherokee nation.., is a distinct community, occu-
pying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described,
in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which
the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the
assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with
treaties, and with the acts of Congress.
16
To reach the conclusion that Georgia law was preempted because
of the relationship between the two sovereignties of the United States
and the Cherokee tribe, "Chief Justice [Marshall] had to rebuff argu-
ments that the tribe had lost its sovereignty, either through the legally
operative effects of discovery and conquest or by ceding it in a treaty,
and had therefore become legally indistinct from other residents of
Georgia."' 7
12. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
13. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
14. Allison M. Dussias, Geographically-Based and Membership-Based Views of Indian
Tribal Sovereignty: The Supreme Court's Changing Vision, 55 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1, 3-4
(1993) (providing excellent, comprehensive analysis of import of Court's shift from geo-
graphically-based to membership-based sovereignty); see also White Mountain Apache
Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 151 (1980) ("The Court has repeatedly emphasized that
there is a significant geographical component to tribal sovereignty .... ).
15. The courts have developed separate tests for determining whether the tribe or the
state may exercise jurisdiction on the reservation. See CoHEN, supra note 4, at 117. A
finding that a tribe does not have jurisdiction does not mean automatically that the state
does. See South Dakota v. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. 2309, 2318 n.12 (1993).
16. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 561.
17. Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present" Colonialism, Constitutionalism,
and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARv. L. REv. 381, 393-94 (1993).
Courts are still often faced with the temptation to acknowledge the perceived "reality"
that tribes have lost much of their sovereignty through conquest and subsequent events.
But this is not a legitimate position under the legal precepts developed by Justice Marshall:
By definition [the tribes] held complete power before contact with European na-
tions-there were no competitors save other tribes. If that original status is legiti-
mized and is accepted as continuing until adjusted by the United States-and
Worcester clearly accorded it that legitimacy-then the courts must turn away
from modem realities as a setting and toward an almost mechanical, linear analy-
[Vol. 28:675
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Recently, however, the Court has clearly moved toward "a view
of sovereignty that bases a tribe's authority over people and activities
on the tribe's reservation on the membership of individual Indians in a
political entity, the tribe."' 8 These recent cases explain that "Indian
tribes are unique aggregations possessing '"attributes of sovereignty
over both their members and their territory."' "19
As a result of this shift in definition, the Court has been able,
from time to time, to cut back on even the powers of local self-govern-
ance. Whereas in Justice Marshall's time, the Cherokee nation had
complete jurisdiction over all people and property on its reservation,
now membership-based sovereignty has allowed the Court to restrict a
tribe's exercise of criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers,2 and has
lead to recent cases that also limit civil jurisdiction over nonmembers
on reservation lands.21
In short, the Court is increasingly willing "to abandon its historic
role as protector of tribal sovereignty" and now has "to some extent
replaced the cavalry as the chief threat to tribal sovereignty."'
sis of whether relevant aspects of pre-Columbian status have been abridged by
the United States.
WILiNsON, supra note 3, at 29-30 (citation omitted).
18. Dussias, supra note 14, at 4.
19. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 332 (1983) (quoting White
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980) (quoting United States v.
Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975))).
20. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191,208 (1978), removed tribal crimi-
nal jurisdiction over non-Indians on reservation land absent specific congressional authori-
zation. The Court recognized that usually Indian tribes are prohibited from exercising
those powers of autonomous states (1) expressly terminated by Congress, or (2) not consis-
tent with their status as sovereigns dependent on the federal government. The Oliphant
Court, however, still found that limitations on tribal sovereignty no longer needed to be
expressly imposed by Congress. Id Oliphant thus opened the door to the possibility for
later courts to discover other limitations on tribal sovereignty by requiring Congress to
expressly delegate that power, rather than presuming that such power exists absent express
abrogation. Dennis W. Arrow, State Jurisdiction over Fee Lands in Indian Country, in
SovEn nir'NY SYmPosIuM V 448, 452-53 (Okla. Supreme Court, Okla. Indian Affairs
Comm'n, & Sovereignty Symposium, Inc. sponsors, 1992).
In Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676,693-94 (1990), the Court expanded Oliphant and held
that a tribe could not assert criminal jurisdiction over an Indian who was not a member of
that tribe. Duro was overturned when Congress passed an amendment to the Indian Civil
Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), expressly recognizing and reaf-
firming tribal criminal jurisdiction over all "Indians" on reservations the following year.
Alex Tallchief Skibine, Duro v. Reina and the Legislation That Overturned It" A Power
Play of Constitutional Dimensions, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 767, 767 (1993).
21. See ag., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981); discussion infra part
I.A.2.
22. Dussias, supra note 14, at 5-6.
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2. Recent developments
Moving toward the view that a tribe's sovereignty is limited to its
membership and not its geographic boundaries has provided a means
for the Court to limit tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians within
reservation boundaries.' During the years prior to Bourland, how-
ever, the Court chose an irregular path-rejecting a tribe's jurisdic-
tion by weakening principles of inherent sovereignty in one case, and
then affirming another tribe's jurisdiction over something else because
of inherent sovereignty in the next case.
In Montana v. United States,24 the Court broke new ground in the
erosion of tribal sovereignty as manifested in civil jurisdiction. Mon-
tana holds that the "exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary
to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations is in-
consistent with the dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot sur-
vive without express congressional delegation."'5 This proposition is
far different than the traditional view that
[t]he sovereignty that the Indian tribes retain is of a unique
and limited character. It exists only at the sufferance of Con-
gress and is subject to complete defeasance. But until Con-
gress acts, the tribes retain their existing sovereign powers. In
sum, Indian tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty
not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a
necessary result of their dependent status.2 6
As the dissent in Bourland accurately characterized, "this passage in
Montana is contrary to 150 years of Indian-law jurisprudence and is
not supported by. the cases on which it relied."2 7
23. See supra part II.A.1.
24. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
25. Id. at 564 (emphasis added). The legal foundations underpinning this newly stated
rule for a tribe's exercise of civil jurisdiction were shaky at best. Justice Blackmun noted
that Montana relied on cases that addressed when a state could exercise jurisdiction over
non-Indians on a reservation-an issue wholly separate from, and irrelevant to, the issue of
a tribe's exercise of jurisdiction based on inherent tribal sovereignty. Brendale v. Confed-
erated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 455-56 (1989) (Black-
mun, J., concurring and dissenting).
26. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
27. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. at 2322 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also Brendale, 492
U.S. at 450 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting) ("Montana is simply one, and not
even the most recent, of a long line of our decisions discussing the nature of inherent tribal
sovereignty. These cases, landmarks in 150 years of Indian-law jurisprudence, establish a
very different 'general principle' governing inherent tribal sovereignty-a principle accord-
ing to which tribes retain their sovereign powers over non-Indians on reservation lands
[Vol. 28:675
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In dicta the Montana Court proposed only two exceptions to its
newly announced rule that Congress must delegate regulatory power
to Indian tribes.28 First, a "tribe may regulate, through taxation, li-
censing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter con-
sensual relationships with the tribe or its members."'29 Second, a
"tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over
the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when
that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integ-
rity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.13 0
The validity of Montana's view that inherent tribal authority over
non-Indians does not survive absent express congressional delegation
was further called into doubt when it played no part in three subse-
quent decisions. In New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe,3' the
Court stated that even in Montana it "specifically recognized that
tribes in general retain [the] authority" to regulate use of their re-
sources.32 In National Farmers Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe,
33
the Court affirmed tribal court jurisdiction over a tort claim against a
political subdivision of the State without reference to Montana's new
rule and exceptions. And in Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante,4
the Court also affirmed tribal court civil jurisdiction without regard to
Montana.35
In Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian
Nation,36 however, the Court returned to Montana in a discussion of
inherent sovereignty. The Court attempted to clarify the second Mon-
tana exception as to when a tribe may assert civil jurisdiction in the
name of tribal preservation if such jurisdiction was not-otherwise ex-
pressly delegated by Congress.37 Brendale was a badly divided plural-
ity decision that failed miserably in its attempt at clarity.3" The Court
unless the exercise of that sovereignty would be 'inconsistent with the overriding interests
of the National Government.' ").
28. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-66.
29. Id. at 565.
30. Id. at 566.
31. 462 U.S. 324 (1983).
32. Id. at 337.
33. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
34. 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
35. In fact, the Court stated that "[ilf state-court jurisdiction over Indians or activities
on Indian lands would interfere with tribal sovereignty and self-government, the state
courts are generally divested of jurisdiction as a matter of federal law." Id. at 15.
36. 492 U.S. 408 (1989) (4-2-3 decision).
37. Id. at 428-32 (plurality opinion).
38. TWo commentators, assessing the practical impact of Montana and Brendale before
the Court rendered its decision in Bourland, noted that "[a]fter Brendale, it is not at all
January 1995]
682 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
did, however, limit the ability of the Yakima Tribe to pass zoning ordi-
nances applicable to reservation lands owned in fee by non-Indians
because it found that the zoning jurisdiction did not sufficiently impli-
cate health and welfare such that tribal preservation was
jeopardized.39
Most significantly, the opinion reaffirmed what Justice White
termed the basic principle of Montana: A tribe's inherent sovereignty
is divested "to the extent it involves a tribe's 'external relations,' "40
and thus there must be an express delegation of power to the tribe
over nonmembers from Congress in order for the tribe's "inherent"
sovereignty to be revested.41
Justice Blackmun disagreed with the majority's reasoning in
Brendale as he had in Bourland.42 Although he objected to Justice
White's narrow interpretation of the second Montana exception, 43 he
more fundamentally objected to the change the Court imposed on the
definition of tribal sovereignty.' The Court's "approach to inherent
tribal sovereignty remained essentially constant in all critical respects"
for a century and a half: While Congress retained the authority to
abrogate tribal sovereignty as it saw fit, tribal sovereignty over inter-
clear who has regulatory jurisdiction over nonmembers' land and natural resources located
within the exterior boundaries of Indian reservations." Timothy R. Malone & Bradley B.
Furber, Regulatory Jurisdiction over Nonmembers' Land within Indian Reservations, 7
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 14, 16 (1993). They predicted that Bourland provided "the
opportunity to resolve that debate and to provide the guidance so sorely lacking after
Brendale." Id. at 55.
39. Justice White's plurality opinion implicitly found that zoning "'threatens or has
some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare
of the tribe,'" but declined to apply the exception. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 429 (plurality
opinion) (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 566). Because the Montana Court only provided
that if the exception applied, a tribe "may" retain inherent power, the Court had room to
find that even a threat to tribal preservation did not necessarily require a finding that the
tribe retained jurisdiction. Id. at 428-29 (plurality opinion).
40. Id. at 426 (plurality opinion). According to Brendale, external relations are those
that involve the tribe and any nonmember of the tribe. Id. (plurality opinion). This defini-
tion sharply contrasts with the traditional view that the "external powers" that tribes were
divested of were those such as the power to enter treaties with foreign nations. COHEN,
supra note 4, at 123.
41. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 425-27 (plurality opinion).
42. Id. at 448 (Blackmun, 3., concurring and dissenting).
43. Reading the Montana decision "in the full context of the Court's other relevant
decisions" results in an understanding that "Montana must be read to recognize the inher-
ent authority of tribes to exercise civil jurisdiction over non-Indian activities on tribal res-
ervations where those activities ... implicate a significant tribal interest." Id. at 449-50
(Blackmun, ., concurring and dissenting).
44. Id. at 451-59 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
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nal affairs was not implicitly divested.4' Thus, while Justice Blackmun
"recognize[d] that Montana strangely reversed the otherwise consis-
tent presumption in favor of inherent tribal sovereignty over reserva-
tion lands," he also believed that "the plain language of Montana
itself expressly preserve[d] substantial tribal authority over non-In-
dian activity on reservations."' 6
The backdrop against which Bourland was decided begins with
the concept that a tribe's jurisdiction is limited only by the reservation
boundaries.4 7 The Court had begun to redefine sovereignty to justify
cutting back on tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers.4 At the time
Bourland was decided, though, the law was far from settled. The
Montana case had gone farthest in redefining sovereignty so that tri-
bal civil jurisdiction could be restricted.49 Yet until Bourland its per-
spective was either not applied in other cases, such as Mescalero
Apache Tribe,50 National Farmers Union Insurance," and Iowa Mu-
tual,52 or when applied, it did not receive a strong mandate from the
Court, as in Brendale5 3
B. Treaty Interpretation
In addition to the presumption in favor of tribal jurisdiction pro-
vided by inherent sovereignty, several long-established principles of
treaty interpretation protected tribal authority. These principles were
developed to counteract the imbalances in positions between the par-
ties during the time treaties were drafted. Inherent tribal sovereignty
is still relevant in this area because "it provides a backdrop against
which the applicable treaties and federal statutes must be read."' 4
First, "[a] cardinal rule in the interpretation of Indian treaties is
that ambiguities are resolved in favor of the Indians.' '55 Second,
45. Id. at 451-52 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
46. 1& at 456 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
47. See supra part II.A.1.
48. See Brendale, 492 U.S. at 408 (plurality opinion); Montana, 450 U.S. at 544.
49. Montana, 450 U.S. at 544.
50. 462 U.S. 324 (1983).
51. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
52. 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
53. 492 U.S. at 408.
54. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973).
55. CorEN, supra note 4, at 37; see also County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation,
470 U.S. 226, 247 (1985) ("ieaties should be construed liberally in favor of the Indians,
with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit."); McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 174-75
(stating that doubtful expressions in treaties are to be resolved in favor of Indians); Win-
ters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576 (1908) (stating that ambiguities in treaties will be
resolved "from the standpoint of the Indians"); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515,
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"since the wording in treaties was designed to be understood by the
Indians, who often could not read and were not learned in the techni-
cal language, doubtful clauses are resolved in a nontechnical way as
the Indians would have understood the language. '56 Third, it is long
established that a "treaty was not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a
grant of rights from them-a reservation of those not granted."57
As a result, "Indian treaties are not mere historical curiosities or
formalities without present relevance. '58 In fact "[tihe reciprocal ob-
ligations assumed by the Federal Government and by the Indian tribes
during a period of almost a hundred years constitute a chief source of
present-day Indian law."59
In most cases a crucial issue-seldom mentioned in the opin-
ions but implicitly a weighty presence to the parties and
judges-is how an old treaty, statute, or court decision
should be applied in times bearing little resemblance to the
era in which the words of law were originally written.
The Court, presented repeatedly with the option of hon-
oring the old laws or of respecting the force of the changed
circumstances, mostly has chosen to enforce the promises. 60
In short, "[flederal Indian law is a subject that cannot be understood if
the historical dimension of existing law is ignored."61
Under these rules of treaty interpretation, the Court historically
required an express showing that Congress intended to abrogate a
552-57 (1832) (discussing appropriate interpretation of treaty terms given Cherokee Na-
tion's expectations and tribe's reasonable understanding of these terms).
56. COHEN, supra note 4, at 37; see also Washington v. Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S.
658, 675-76 (1979) (reaffirming that, in interpreting treaties, courts should not permit
United States superior negotiating position and familiarity with English language during
treaty formation to be used to Indians' disadvantage); Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435
U.S. 191, 206 (1978) (stating that treaties "cannot be interpreted in isolation but must be
read in light of the common notions of the day and the assumptions of those who drafted
them"); Fleming v, McCurtain, 215 U.S. 56, 61 (1909) ("[Iln case of any well-founded
doubt as to the construction of the treaty, it is to be construed most favorably toward the
Choctaws."); Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 11 (1899) (holding that treaties should not be
construed "according to the technical meaning of its words to learned lawyers, but in the
sense in which they would naturally be understood by the Indians").
57. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905).
58. Charles F. Wilkinson, A Summary of the Law of American Indian Treaties, in MAN-
UAL OF INDIAN LAW at J-1 (The American Indian Lawyer Training Program, Inc. ed.,
1976).
59. COHEN, supra note 4, at 33.
60. WILKrNsoN, supra note 3, at 4-5.
61. COHEN, supra note 4, at xxvii.
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right.6 2 Requiring express congressional intent provided an important
safeguard. Given the age of Indian treaties and the volume of federal
legislation passed without considering the possible effects on tribal
sovereignty, implied abrogation would likely erode many rights me-
morialized by long-standing treaties.63
As discussed later, Bourland is surprising in its application of
these doctrines of treaty interpretation:' Rather than requiring ex-
press congressional intent to abrogate a treaty right; the majority con-
cluded that the right in question had been abrogated without even a




The controversy that developed into the Bourland case began
along the banks of the Missouri River, which forms the eastern border
of the Cheyenne River Reservation in South Dakota.6 Originally,
the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868 established the Great Sioux Reserva-
tion for the "undisturbed use and occupation" of Sioux Tribes.67 The
Treaty "confirmed the Tribe's sovereignty over the land in question in
the most sweeping terms.'' 68 Yet because the sovereignty of Indian
tribes is inherent, the Treaty memorialized, but did not create, the
62. See, e.g., Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 413 (1968) (" '[T]he
intention to abrogate or modify a treaty is not to be lightly imputed to the Congress.'"
(quoting Pigeon River Co. v. Cox Co., 291 U.S. 138, 160 (1934))).
63. One commentator has noted that
[q]uestions of implied repeal arise disproportionately often in Indian law. This is
due in part to the comparatively ancient recognition of tribal prerogatives in the
treaties and treaty substitutes. Congress has had generations to pass general laws
on related subjects .... [And] the age and scope of many Indian laws make them
especially likely to come within the facial coverage of general regulatory laws that
do not explicitly refer to Indians.
WIuaNSON, supra note 3, at 46.
For example, in Menominee, the Court was called upon to interpret whether an act
terminating federal recognition of an Indian tribe implicitly destroyed the members' hunt-
ing and fishing rights that had been affirmed by treaty. 391 U.S. 404. The Court stated,
"[w]e find it difficult to believe that Congress, without explicit statement, would subject the
United States to a claim for compensation by destroying property rights conferred by
treaty," and denied that such rights had been abrogated by implication. Id at 413.
64. See infra part V.B.
65. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. at 2322 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
66. 1& at 2313.
67. 15 Stat. 635, 636 (1869).
68. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. at 2322 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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tribes' authority, jurisdiction, and rights.69 It also documented what
rights the tribes expressly gave up.
Despite the Treaty, expansionist pressures soon proved too great.
By the Act of March 2, 1889, Congress expressly abrogated treaty
rights, took some of the Great Sioux Reservation land, and divided
the remainder into six smaller reservations, one of which was the
Cheyenne River Reservation. 70 This Act provided for the preserva-
tion of the other tribal rights affirmed in the Fort Laramie Treaty, and
noted that the land on the Cheyenne River Reservation was to be
held in trust for Cheyenne River Sioux by the United States.71
Congress subsequently decided that the Oahe Dam and Reser-
voir Project would be built on reservation lands for flood control in
the Missouri River basin.72 The Flood Control Act of 194473 "author-
ized the establishment of a comprehensive flood control plan along
the Missouri River, which serves as the eastern border of the Chey-
enne River Reservation."' 4 To carry out the Flood Control Act, the
Cheyenne River Act7' provided $10,544,014 for the purchase of
104,420 acres of reservation lands to build the Oahe Dam and Reser-
voir Project.7 6 Though no longer owned by the tribe,77 these lands
remained within the tribe's reservation boundaries.78
During the seventies, non-Indians living on and near reservations
began to organize out of "fear of having any aspect of their lives or
property regulated or controlled by Indian governments, which, by
definition, were not responsive to or controlled by non-Indians."
79
During this time, the tribal government of the Cheyenne River Sioux
Reservation increasingly exercised and expanded its powers.80 As a
69. Id. at 2321-22 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
70. Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 405, 25 Stat. 888.
71. South Dakota v. Bourland, 949 F.2d 984, 987 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 113 S.
Ct. 51 (1992).
72. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. at 2313.
73. Ch. 665, 58 Stat. 887.
74. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. at 2313.
75. Act of Sept. 3, 1954, ch. 1260, 68 Stat. 1191, 1191.
76. Id. at 1191-92.
77. The Court "assumes the United States acquired these lands in fee." Bourland, 113
S. Ct. at 2314 n.4.
78. Id. at 2313.
79. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RiGHTS, INDIAN TmES: A CONTINuIo QUEST FOR SUR.
VIVAL 7 (1981). Underlying many disputes over the exercise of tribal jurisdiction is the
reality that non-Indians on reservation lands object to the exercise of tribal jurisdiction,
presumably in a way they would not object to an exercise of state jurisdiction, because of
this fear. Id.
80. Id. at 8.
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result of this expansion and events on other reservations, tensions
were high in South Dakota between Indians and those non-Indians
organizing to prohibit the exercise of tribal jurisdiction over
nonmembers.8 1
Nevertheless, until a disagreement erupted over deer-hunting
season in 1988, "both the Tribe and the State of South Dakota en-
forced their respective game and fish regulations in the taken area.
The Tribe enforced its regulations against all violators; the State lim-
ited its enforcement to non-Indians."'  When the tribe stopped recog-
nizing state-issued hunting licenses and began imposing civil fines on
violators in tribal court,8 3 South Dakota filed suit "to enjoin the Tribe
from excluding non-Indians from hunting on non-trust lands within
the reservation. In the alternative, the State sought a declaration that
the federal takings of tribal lands for the Oahe Dam and Reservoir
had reduced the Tribe's authority by withdrawing these lands from the
reservation." 8
B. The Decision of the District Court
The district court began by finding that the government's
purchase of lands under the Cheyenne River Act "'did not disestab-
lish the Missouri River boundary of the Cheyenne River Reserva-
tion.' "85 However, as the district court opinion was written in the
aftermath of the Montana and Brendale decisions, the district court
enjoined the tribe from regulating hunting and fishing by nontribal
members on reservation lands.83 The district court found that in the
Cheyenne River Act, Congress had "clearly abrogated" the tribe's
right to exclusive use and possession of the purchased lands. 7 The
court also determined that Congress had not delegated the right to
regulate hunting and fishing to the tribe.8
81. Id. at 8-10.
82. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. at 2314.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. South Dakota v. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. 2309, 2314 (1993) (quoting unpublished dis-
trict court opinion). Even though the land was no longer owned by the tribe, it no more
meant that it lost its reservation status than would the sale of state-owned land diminish
the borders of the state. Only when Congress expressly manifests the intent to diminish
reservation boundaries does a tribe lose general jurisdiction over that land to the state. See
Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 586, 630 (1977).
86. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. at 2315.
87. Id. at 2314.
88. Id. at 2315.
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C. The Decision of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed in part.8 9
The Eighth Circuit, like the district court, viewed the case as involving
only a treaty rights issue: Did the Cheyenne River Act or Flood Con-
trol Act abrogate the tribe's treaty rights, and if they did, which rights
were affected?
The Eighth Circuit looked to the Montana and Brendale deci-
sions. Understandably, the court tried to read Montana and Brendale
in a manner consistent with longstanding precedent which required a
court to find express congressional intent to abrogate treaty rights.90
In Montana, the land at issue had been held in fee by non-Indians
after being taken from the tribe pursuant to a policy in which destroy-
ing Indian sovereignty was an explicit goal.91 ' Because of this over-
arching policy, the Eighth Circuit believed that Congress also meant
to expressly abrogate the lesser right of the tribe to regulate non-In-
dian hunting and fishing on fee land acquired by non-Indians.92
The Eighth Circuit examined the legislative history of the Chey-
enne River Act and found that "the Act reveals no clear intent to
eliminate tribal regulatory rights." 93 The court held:
89. South Dakota v. Bourland, 949 F.2d 984 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 51
(1992).
90. Id. at 991.
91. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 559 & n.9 (1981).
The late 1800s and the early 1900s are sometimes known as the Allotment Era. The
General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887,24 Stat. 388, and the Act of May 29,1908, ch. 218,
35 Stat. 460-61, divided reservation lands previously held in trust by the United States for
the entire tribe, parceled out tracts to individual Indians, and then allowed the government
to sell off "surplus" lands to non-Indians. This policy resulted in huge decreases in the
amount of reservation lands held in trust by the United States. For example, the land held
in trust-for the Cheyenne River Sioux now amounts to "slightly less than half" of what it
had. Bourland, 949 F.2d at 987. However, terminating a tribal government required spe-
cial legislation, and allotment of reservation lands alone did not disestablish reservation
boundaries. See, e.g., Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463,470 (1984); Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S.
481, 504 (1973). The Allotment Era ended in 1934 with the passage of the Indian Reorgan-
ization Act, ch. 576, § 1, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 461
(1988)).
The Montana court was confronted with the issue of whether Congress intended to
abrogate the tribe's treaty rights to regulate hunting and fishing when it passed an Allot-
ment Era bill. "[Ain avQwed purpose of the allotment policy was the ultimate destruction
of tribal government." Montana, 450 U.S. at 560 n.9. Given this blunt purpose, even the
requirement that there be express legislative intent to abrogate treaty rights was satisfied.
Id. However, finding congressional intent to divest a tribe of a right did not support the
Montana Court's statement that therefore any 'exercise of tribal power.., cannot survive
without express congressional delegation." Id at 564.
92. Bourland, 949 F.2d at 990.
93. Id. at 994.
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The correct analysis, the one counselled by the Supreme
Court, is to look to the purpose of the [Cheyenne River] Act
and to decide a jurisdictional issue left unresolved by the lan-
guage of the Act in light of that purpose. As the purpose of
the Act was simply to enable the United States to acquire the
land needed for the construction of the Oahe Dam and Res-
ervoir, and to do so with as little disruption as possible to the
life of the Tribe, the Tribe must be given the benefit of the
doubt. We do not have here the essential "clear evidence
that Congress actually considered the conflict between its in-
tended action on the one hand and Indian treaty rights on
the other, and chose to resolve that conflict by abrogating
the treaty." 94
Lands taken through the Act that had previously been owned by
non-Indians had to be analyzed separately. The Eighth Circuit inter-
preted Montana to require an affirmative grant of jurisdiction from
Congress only over these types of lands.95 Because "Congress has not
affirmatively granted to the Tribe regulatory authority oyer such
land,"96 the case was remanded to the district court for a determina-
tion of whether one of the Montana exceptions would allow the tribe
to regulate these lands as well.97 The Supreme Court granted certio-
rari98 and reversed the Court of Appeals.99
IV. REASONING OF THE SUPREME COURT
Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, took a two-pronged ap-
proach in his assault on tribal rights. First, much of his opinion con-
sists of the Court's construction of the Cheyenne River and Flood
Control Acts to infer congressional intent to abrogate the treaty rights
of the Cheyenne River Sioux. In doing so, Justice Thomas abandoned
the canons of treaty interpretation.Ico Second, the opinion barely
deals with whether the tribe has rights arising from inherent sover-
eignty. Dismissing so lightly this foundational principle of federal In-
94. Id. (quoting United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 740 (1986)).
95. Id. at 995.
96. Id
97. Id For a discussion of the Montana exceptions, see supra text accompanying notes
28-30.
98. South Dakota v. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. 51 (1992) (granting certiorari).
99. South Dakota v. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. 2309, 2310 (1993).
100. See supra part I.B.
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dian law has the potential to disrupt the balance of power between
tribes, the federal government, and the states.101
A. Laying the Groundwork
The Bourland majority first briefly summarized the entire history
of treaty interpretation precedent: "Congress has the power to abro-
gate Indians' treaty rights, though we usually insist that Congress
clearly express its intent to do so."'" The Court, without acknowledg-
ing inherent tribal sovereignty as a potential source of rights, assumed
that the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe's authority to regulate hunting
and fishing was entirely treaty-based, °3 and that the statutes related




Justice Thomas then construed the Montana decision to require
that when land alienation broadly opens reservation lands to non-In-
dians, preexisting Indian rights to regulatory control are destroyed,
regardless of Congress's intent in opening that land. 05 Under this
broad reading of Montana, if a tribe conveys reservation lands to non-
Indians pursuant to an act of Congress, the Court will not engage in a
traditional treaty interpretation analysis to determine if Congress had
the specific intent to abrogate treaty rights. Rather, the Court will
assume all treaty rights have been abrogated unless Congress took the
time to explicitly preserve them-something Congress was unlikely to
have done given the "usual" requirement that they expressly indicate
their intent to abrogate Indian rights.
B. Applying the Test
Once the issue was framed in this manner, all the Court needed
to do was note that the Cheyenne River and Flood Control Acts re-
quired the tribe to convey lands to the United States in a manner that
broadly opened those lands to use by non-Indians and all treaty rights
relating to that land evaporate. Thus, the Court observed that the
Flood Control Act provided that the Oahe Dam and Reservoir Pro-
ject should be "open to public use generally" for "recreational pur-
101. See supra part II.A.
102. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. at 2315-16 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
103. Id. at 2316 ("[P]ursuant to its original [Fort Laramie] treaty with the United States,
the Cheyenne River Tribe possessed both the greater power to exclude non-Indians from,
and arguably the lesser-included, incidental power to regulate non-Indian use of, the lands
later taken for the Oahe Dam and Reservoir Project.").
104. Id.
105. Id. at 2316, 2318.
[Vol. 28:675
January 1995] , THE COURT REPLACES THE CAVALRY 691
poses."'1 The Court then concluded that as "the area at issue here
has been broadly opened to the public,""1 7 and "[b]ecause hunting
and fishing are 'recreational purposes,' the Flood Control Act affirma-
tively allows non-Indians to hunt and fish on such lands, subject to
federal regulation."' 0 Furthermore, the Cheyenne River Act affirma-
tively reserved the tribe's right to hunt and fish on the taken lands.
Consequently, if "Congress had intended by this provision to grant the
Tribe the additional right to regulate hunting and fishing, it would
have done so by a similarly explicit statutory command."'10 9
Justice Thomas concluded that "Congress, through the Flood
Control and Cheyenne River Acts eliminated the Tribe's power to ex-
clude non-Indians from these lands, and with that the incidental regu-
latory jurisdiction formerly enjoyed by the Tribe." 0
C. The Court's Review of the Eighth Circuit's Analysis
The Court faulted the Eighth Circuit for not applying its reading
of Montana to all the taken lands, regardless of prior ownership sta-
tus: "Whether land is conveyed pursuant to an Act of Congress for
homesteading or for flood control purposes, when Congress has
broadly opened up such land to non-Indians, the effect of the transfer
is the destruction of pre-existing Indian rights to regulatory
control.""'
The Court's analysis nullifies the legislative intent behind passing
a bill allowing reservation lands to be purchased by non-Indians.
1 2
Congress must affirmatively grant a tribe regulatory authority over
such lands, or one of the Montana exceptions-preserving the tribe or
consent given by non-Indians-would have to justify tribal regulatory
control."3
Though the Cheyenne River Act preserved some land-use rights
-mineral, grazing, timber, hunting, and fishing-for the tribe, the
Court disputed the Eighth Circuit's conclusion that the sale did not
amount to a "simple conveyance of land and all attendant inter-
106. Id. at 2317 (quoting § 4, 58 Stat. 889-90 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 460d
(1988))).
107. Id. at 2316 n.9.
108. I. at 2317.
109. I&
110. I& at 2316-17.
111. Id. at 2318.
112. Id. at 2318 n.13.
113. Id. at 2320.
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ests." 114 The Court decided that "Congress' explicit reservation of
certain rights in the taken area does not operate as an implicit reserva-
tion of all former rights," 115 because "[w]hen Congress reserves lim-
ited rights to a tribe or its members, the very presence of such a
limited reservation of rights suggests that the Indians would otherwise
be treated like the public at large."' 16
D. What Ever Happened to Inherent Sovereignty?
The Court addressed the fundamental issue of inherent sover-
eignty in one brief paragraph and a footnote."17 The Court quoted
and reaffirmed the unprecedented language in Montana that tribal au-
thority "'cannot survive without express congressional delega-
tion.' "I'll In fact, the Court in Bourland acknowledged the judicial
inventiveness of Montana even as the Court applied that case. 19
Not surprisingly, the Court found "no evidence in the relevant
treaties or statutes that Congress intended to allow the Tribe to assert
regulatory jurisdiction over these lands pursuant to inherent sover-
eignty."' 12 What is surprising is the willingness of the Court to cast off
over 150 years of precedent with the blithe and unsupported comment
that "after Montana, tribal sovereignty over nonmembers 'cannot sur-
vive without express congressional delegation,' and is therefore not
inherent.""'2
E. Other Potential Sources'of Tribal Jurisdiction
The Court also analyzed the exceptions to Montana's general
proposition that a tribe does not have authority over nonmembers of
the tribe. The exceptions arise when the nonmember has consensual
contractual or commercial relationships with the tribe or its members,
or if regulation of nonmembers is essential to the survival of the
tribe." " The Court noted that the district court "made extensive find-
114. South Dakota v. Bourland, 949 F.2d 984, 993 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 113 S.
Ct. 51 (1992).
115. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. at 2318.
116. Id. at 2319. But see supra text accompanying note 57.
117. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. at 2319-20 & n.15.
118. Id. at 2319 (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981)).
119. Id. at 2320 n.15 ("Montana ... announced 'the general proposition that the inher-
ent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of
the tribe.'" (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 565)).
120. Id. at 2319-20.
121. Id. at 2320 n.15 (citation omitted) (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 564).
122. Id. at 2320.
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ings that neither of these exceptions applies,"'" but becausethe court
of appeals did not comment on this finding as to the taken land as a
whole, the Court left the issue to be resolved upon remand. 124
Because the Cheyenne River Act gave the taken lands to the
Army Corps of Engineers to regulate in a manner "'not inconsistent
with ... treaties and Federal laws and regulations' concerning 'the
fights of Indian Nations,' ,,u the tribe argued that this "affirmatively
establish[ed] the primacy of tribal treaty rights, over both public use
rights and state and federal regulatory interests."' 26 The Court dis-
missed this argument as undeveloped. 27
V. ANALYsis
A. The Abandonment of Inherent Sovereignty
There are several flawed assumptions in the majority's reasoning.
First, the Court "supposes that the Tribe's right to regulate non-Indian
hunting and fishing is incidental to and dependent on its treaty right to
exclusive use of the area and that the Tribe's right to regulate was
therefore lost when its right to exclusive use was abrogated."" As
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Souter, pointed out in his vehe-
ment dissent,
the majority's myopic focus on the [Fort Laramie] Treaty ig-,
nores the fact that this Treaty merely confirmed the Tribe's
pre-existing sovereignty over the reservation land. Even on
the assumption that the Tribe's treaty-based right to regulate
hunting and fishing by non-Indians was lost with the Tribe's
power to exclude non-Indians, its inherent authority to regu-
late such hunting and fishing continued. 29
The dissent in Bourland is rightly concerned with the Court's cas-
ual disposal-in a footnote-of the concept of inherent tribal sover-
eignty. Because for so long the Court has held that the regulatory
authority of Indian tribes exists over their members and territory,
30
regulatory jurisdiction over nonmembers within that territory has
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. (quoting 36 C.F.R. § 327.1(t) (1992)).
126. Id. (quoting Brief for Respondents at 33).
127. Id. at 2321.
128. Id. at 2323 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
129. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
130. IM. at 2321 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S.
313, 323 (1978) (quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975))).
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been the logical result.1 3 1 The longstanding exception had been that
Congress may withdraw the existing sovereign power, but "Indian
tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by
treaty or statute or by implication as a necessary result of their depen-
dent status."' 32 The implicit removal of sovereign power had been
found by the Court only in situations where tribal sovereignty con-
flicted with the interests of the federal government, such as when
tribes had sought to establish relations with foreign governments, or
prosecuted non-Indians in tribal courts where full Bill of Rights pro-
tections did not exist.1
33
Furthermore, just as the Court's reading of Montana was con-
trary to extensive precedent, the Bourland majority never explained
how such a reading was viable in light of post-Montana decisions that
reaffirmed inherent tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on reser-
vation lands." 4 For example, Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe 3 5 de-
termined that a tribe had inherent authority to tax non-Indian mining
on its reservation, and Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante136 al-
lowed that tribal authority over non-Indians on reservation lands was
essential to tribal sovereignty, and thus civil jurisdiction presumptively
remained with the tribe unless specifically limited by Congress.
This determination by the Bourland Court that tribal sovereignty
is not inherent' 37 represented no less than an overthrow of the princi-
ples underlying federal Indian law. If the sovereignty of a tribe is not
inherent, and must be expressly delegated by Congress, the Cheyenne
River Sioux are no longer sovereign as to their reservation lands.
The Bourland majority did not address whether South Dakota
had jurisdiction to regulate hunting and fishing in the taken area be-
cause the state did not present the issue in its action. 38 However, the
131. 1& (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 2321-22 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323).
133. Id at 2322 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also Washington v. Confederated "libes
of the Colville Indian Reservations, 447 U.S. 134, 153-54 (1980) (stating that tribal sover-
eignty is subject to overriding federal interests).
134. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S.
408, 453-56 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
135. 455 U.S. 130, 141 (1982).
136. 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987); see also National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tdbe of
Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985) (requiring exhaustion of tribal court remedies before district
court had jurisdiction to hear civil claim); New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462
U.S. 324 (1983) (prohibiting state from concurrently regulating nonmember hunting and
fishing on reservation).
137. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. at 2320 n.15.
138. Id. at 2318 n.12.
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Court took the time to state that primary regulatory authority was
given to the Army Corps of Engineers with the provision that "'[a]ll
Federal, state and local laws governing these activities apply on pro-
ject lands and waters as regulated by authorized enforcement offi-
cials.' "139 Since the majority also went out of its way to exclude
"tribal laws" from the definition of "local laws,"" 4 there is little doubt
that subsequent determinations will find that such activities fall within
the traditional police powers of the state.
B. Congressional Intent Is Key in Treaty Interpretation
In addition to abandoning the principle of inherent sovereignty
for Indian tribes, the Court also did not follow precedent when it de-
cided that later congressional acts abrogated the Fort Laramie Treaty.
As principles of treaty interpretation favor Indians, "the majority
[was] right to proceed on the assumption that authority to control
hunting and fishing is included in the.Fort Laramie Treaty.""' How-
ever, Justice Blackmun's dissent pointed out that in analyzing whether
this Treaty was later abrogated by the Flood Control and Cheyenne
River Acts, "[t]he United States did not take this land with the pur-
pose of destroying tribal government or even with the purpose of lim-
iting tribal authority. It simply wished to build a dam."' 2 In addition,
it is implausible that the tribe would have thought that the Cheyenne
River and Flood Control Acts meant that "every right subsumed in
the Fort Laramie Treaty's sweeping language [would] be defeated the
moment they lost the right to exclusive use of their land."' 43
Justice Thomas also relied on language in the Cheyenne River
Act stating that the payment designated for the tribe was in "'final
and complete settlement of all claims' " to justify his break from the
trust duties traditionally imposed on Congress. He proclaims that "we
will not conclude that the [Cheyenne River] Act reserved to the Tribe
the right to regulate hunting and fishing simply because the legislative
history does not include an itemized amount for the Tribe's loss of
revenue from licensing those activities."'145 But the Cheyenne Act's
"final and complete settlement of all claims" language "simply makes
139. Id. at 2320 (quoting 36 C.F.R. § 327.8 (1992)).
140. Id at 2321 n.16.
141. Id. at 2322 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
142. Id at 2321 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
143. Id at 2323 (Blackmun, L, dissenting).
144. Id at 2319 (quoting Act of Sept. 3, 1954, § 2, 68 Stat. 1191, 1191).
145. Id.
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clear that Congress intended no further compensation for the rights it
took from the Tribe. It does not address the question of which rights
Congress intended to take or, more specifically, whether Congress in-
tended to take the Tribe's right to regulate hunting and fishing .... "146
In addition, opening up the land for "recreational purposes" does
not automatically determine that the tribe therefore cannot regulate
those activities. Even if the tribe is under a mandate to allow non-
Indians to engage in hunting and fishing, regulation through issuing
licenses and imposing civil fines would remain within its purview147
The potential impact of this aspect of the Bourland decision, like
that relating to inherent sovereignty, is also quite astonishing. The
tension between tribes and states over jurisdiction has existed since
the Cherokee nation and Georgia first did battle.148 Congress has ple-
nary power over tribes,149 but it will not be surprising if it rarely exer-
cises its power over what are essentially local matters to affirmatively
delegate authority to a tribe. On the other hand, many years have
passed since treaties were last ratified, years in which Congress has
passed many laws without contemplating the possibility that such laws
might conflict with tribal jurisdiction.' Until recently there Was no
need to worry about these facial conflicts because tribal jurisdiction
would not have been implicitly abrogated as in Bourland but would
instead have required express deprivation by Congress.
VI. CONCLUSION
Congress has plenary power over tribes and at times has adopted
policies, like those during the Allotment Era, 5' that have stripped In-
dian tribes of land and resources. Throughout the history of this
country, states have clashed with tribes over jurisdiction. In the con-
flicts, the state's sovereign police power has always threatened to
swallow up that of the smaller independent sovereigns within their
boundaries. Traditionally, the Court has acknowledged that tribes
have inherent sovereignty that predated conquest. 5 Accordingly, all
tribal rights not conceded by treaty remained vested in the tribe.
146. Id. at 2324 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 2323 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
148. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
150. WILKNSON, supra note 3, at 46.
151. See supra note 91.
152. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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The Court also recognized that, as a result of this inherent sover-
eignty and the superior bargaining power the federal government has
relative to tribes in drawing up treaties and passing subsequent legisla-
tion, congressional intent to abrogate rights should not be lightly im-
puted. Express congressional intent was required to abrogate a right,
whether affirmed in a treaty or derived from inherent sovereignty.
Abandoning these principles allows courts, in effect, to construe
the dozens of laws, which facially implicate tribal authority, passed by
Congress since treaties were last ratified to abrogate tribal jurisdic-
tion. This new principle requires a court to construe such acts of Con-
gress without regard to congressional intent in passing that act, even if
there is evidence that Congress never considered the possibility that
the act might implicate tribal sovereignty. The only hope the Court
leaves in place for Indian tribes to retain their authority over non-
member activities on reservation lands is if Congress takes the time toaffirmatively delegate jurisdfction to the tribes-something unlikely
to have occurred because Congress has passed laws with the knowl-
edge that tribes would retain jurisdictional authority unless it ex-
pressly deprived them of that authority.
Conquest failed to deprive indigenous cultures of their preexist-
ing status as sovereigns. Congress has abandoned the Allotment Era
policy of seeking destruction of tribal sovereignty and total assimila-
tion of its members in favor of preserving cultural diversity. It seems
odd that the Court now, despite the unquestioned plenary power of
Congress to pass laws and set policy for Indian tribes, has undertaken
a groundbreaking position that will erode a tribe's authority over its
own reservation. The Court will have done what conquest could
not-destroy Indian sovereignty.
Lisa Baird*
* I wish to thank my fellow editors and staffers on'Loyola of Los Angeles Law Re-
view for their assistance. I owe special thanks to my husband, Allen Ongchangco, for his
extraordinary love, support, and patience.
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